Two opinions recently issued from the Northern District of California have important implications for parties seeking privacy class actions. Both opinions highlight the evolving jurisprudence around establishing standing for consumer privacy lawsuits.
In re Apple iPhone Application Litigation
Judge Koh disagreed, finding that plaintiffs failed to create a genuine issue of material fact concerning their standing under Article III, the UCL, and the CLRA. Judge Koh held that plaintiffs presented enough evidence of injury—that plaintiffs purportedly overpaid for their iPhones and suffered reduced iPhone performance. Conversely though, Judge Koh held that plaintiffs could not establish that such injury was causally linked to Apple’s alleged misrepresentations. Judge Koh ruled that actual reliance was essential for standing. Accordingly, plaintiffs must have (1) seen the misrepresentations; and (2) acted on those misrepresentations. Judge Koh noted that none of the plaintiffs had even seen the alleged misrepresentations prior to purchasing their iPhones, or at any time thereafter. Because none of the plaintiffs had even seen the misrepresentations, they could not have relied upon such misrepresentations. Without reliance, Judge Koh held that plaintiffs’ claims could not survive.
In assessing standing, Judge Grewal noted that “injury-in-fact has proven to be a significant barrier to entry,” and that establishing standing in the Northern District of California is akin to climbing Mount Kilimanjaro. Notwithstanding the high burden, Judge Grewal found that plaintiffs adequately alleged standing.
Plaintiffs alleged standing based on (1) commingling of personally identifiable information; (2) direct economic injury; and (3) statutory violations. With respect to the commingling argument, plaintiffs contended that Google never compensated plaintiffs for the value associated with commingling PII amongst different Google products. Judge Grewal rejected this argument, noting that a plaintiff may not establish standing by pointing to a defendant’s profit; rather, plaintiff must actually suffer damages as a result of defendant’s conduct.
With respect to plaintiffs’ allegations of direct economic injury, Judge Grewal held that those allegations sufficed to confer standing. Plaintiffs argued they suffered direct economic injuries because of reduced performance of Android devices (plaintiffs had to pay for the battery power used by Google to send data to third parties). Plaintiffs also argued that they overpaid for their phones and had to buy different phones because of Google’s practices. These allegations sufficed to establish injury. Based on Judge Koh’s opinion in Apple, one key issue in the Google case will likely be whether any of the plaintiffs actually read and relied upon Google’s privacy policies.
Finally, Judge Grewal found that standing could be premised on the alleged violation of statutory rights. This ruling is consistent with the trend in other federal courts. Though Judge Grewal ultimately dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, the opinion’s discussion of standing will be informative to both the plaintiff and defense bars in privacy litigation.
The Apple and Google lawsuits represent a fraction of the many lawsuits seeking to recover damages and/or injunctive relief for the improper collection and/or use of consumer information. Establishing standing remains a difficult hurdle for plaintiffs in consumer privacy lawsuits, though courts are increasingly accepting standing arguments based on statutory violations and allegations of economic injuries. The Apple decision is on appeal, so we will see if the Ninth Circuit sheds further light on issues of standing in privacy lawsuits.